Back on Shevuot 19b, after categorizing the four types of oaths, the mishnah presented a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues:
If he said, “On my oath I will not eat,” and then ate any amount, even less than an olive’s bulk, he is liable (to bring an offering). — This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
The rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable?
Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it?
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In most cases of forbidden eating, a certain minimal amount — usually the same volume as an olive — must be eaten to incur liability. But when it comes to a person’s oath not to eat, according to Rabbi Akiva even smaller quantities incur liability. His colleagues are understandably surprised and ask, doubtfully, whether there are other cases in Jewish law in which an arbitrarily small amount of consumption can incur liability. Rabbi Akiva, in turn, asks another challenging question: Are there any cases in which a person can be liable for an offering purely on account of their words (and not their actions)? His point is that oaths are characterized by unique stringencies — and this supports his view that swallowing even a morsel smaller than an olive can put one in violation of an oath not to eat.
The Gemara, in the ensuing pages, addresses both questions in the mishnah. Today, the focus is on whether words alone can incur the consequence of bringing a sacrifice. It turns out, they often can. For example:
Isn’t a blasphemer liable to bring an offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva?
We are speaking of one who speaks and in doing so generates a prohibition. And this one, the blasphemer, is merely one who speaks and sins.
In one sense, the blasphemer is like the oath-taker insofar as their speech gives rise to potentially serious consequences. But the Gemara points out an important difference: Generally, the oath-taker’s speech creates the prohibition that they might then violate by their actions, while the blasphemer’s utterance is, in and of itself, a transgression. Moreover, a blasphemer isn’t required to bring a sacrifice — they’re liable to be executed.
Let’s look at another example:
But doesn’t a nazirite render wine forbidden to himself through speech, by making a vow? And he does bring an offering.
We are speaking of one who brings an offering specifically for his speaking, and this one, the nazirite, brings an offering at the end of his naziriteship in order to permit wine to himself.
The nazir takes an oath to abstain from wine and all grape-derived products, cutting their hair and having contact with the dead. At the end of their period of abstention, the nazir brings an offering to the Temple to release themselves of their vow. But this too is an imperfect analogy for an oath-taker because, in contrast, the person who violates an oath brings an offering because they have already broken their word, not as a ritual conclusion to their period of constraint.
Here’s a third example of a case in which words might incur liability for a sacrifice:
But isn’t consecrated property a case where one renders an item forbidden via speech alone and brings an offering for its misuse?
We are speaking of one who, by speaking, generates a prohibition for himself, and nevertheless brings an offering. And this one, who consecrates an item, generates a prohibition for the whole world.
It is true that consecrating an item to the Temple creates a prohibition: That item can no longer be used for ordinary purposes. And it’s also true that using the consecrated item for an ordinary purpose incurs liability to bring a sacrifice. But this too is not a perfect analogy for the oath-taker because the verbal declaration doesn’t apply only to the speaker, but to the “entire world.” When a person consecrates an item, anyone who misuses it incurs liability.
There are yet more examples on the daf but we’ll pause the analysis here. The rabbis have certainly shown what will come as no surprise to longtime students of Talmud: There are indeed many ways that speech alone can incur significant liability — for sacrifices and even far greater consequences. But oaths are, nonetheless, their own category of law and therefore have their own logic and rules. We’ll explore more of them as the tractate unfolds.
Read all of Shevuot 22 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on May 23, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
